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Abstract 
    The objective of this study was to provide empirical findings whether corporate governance, financial measures, and sukuk 
structure have a significant influence on sukuk rating. This study finds some interesting results. The board size has a positively 
significant influence on the corporate governance in relation to sukuk ratings. The study also demonstrated that financial leverage 
is negatively related to financial measures and sukuk ratings relationship. The study also demonstrated that sukuk ijarah is 
positively related to sukuk structure and sukuk rating relationship. The empirical findings are based on a sample of 25 Malaysian 
publicly traded firms rated by Malaysian rating agencies of RAM and MARC equivalent to S&P over the 2008 and 2012 period. 
The selected sample is representative enough in that rated and non-rated firms share similar characteristics in terms of (i) their 
stock return distribution, (ii) the profits they generate, and (iii) their industry distribution in similar industrial sectors. 
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1. Introduction and Background of the Study 
There are several empirical evidences documented in the academic world indicating that sukuk issuance play 
significant roles in Islamic bond ratings (hereafter referred to as sukuk ratings). In the earliest years of the twenty-
first century, Islamic finance took root particularly in real estate and private equity for which these areas of 
investment were chosen because of market opportunities and the particular expertise and preferences of Middle 
Eastern investors (McMillen 2007). In the modern economy, sukuk market and sukuk are an integral part of the 
financial sector and effectively supplement the funds provided by the banking sector (Sukor, et al. 1970). In the year 
2003, real estate investments began to be made on a significant scale in Europe following seminal Shariah-
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compliant, combined with sukuk offerings as results of the acceleration of sukuk issuance in 2001 and 2003 
(McMillen 2007). However, earlier studies tended to focus on the technicalities of sukuk market development 
especially in Southeast Asia after the financial crisis (Sharma 2001). From the conventional perspective, bonds 
(sukuk) can be defined as a long-term contract under which a borrower agrees to make payment of interest and 
principal, on specific dates, to the bonds holders (Sukor, et al. 1970). Sukuk are defined as “the certificates of equal 
value representing, after closing subscription, receipt of the value of the certificates and putting it to use as planned, 
common title to shares and rights in tangible assets, usufructs and services, or equity of a given project or equity of a 
special investment activity” (Finance 2008) (p, 43). “Sukuk are actually certificates or documents of debt issued by a 
government or an organization for an amount of money they borrow from the bondholders, promising them that it 
will pay back the money it has borrowed, usually with interest” (Sukor, et al. 1970) (p.86). According to S & P 
“Sukuk or Islamic notes is a number of Islamic law compliant activity, mostly delivered by sovereign, supranational, 
regional, or in other circumstances, government-backed entities or, a type of obligations delivered for Shariah-
compliant activity (Archive 2006, 1). 
This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance, financial ratios, sukuk structure and sukuk 
ratings to determine the levels of the relationships using Malaysian publicly held firms. Each of the relationships 
yields different results since they are affected by different corporate mechanisms and the goal of this article is to 
explore each of these different mechanisms to provide empirical evidences. Previous empirical studies reveal 
divergent views of researchers on the issue about the relationship between corporate governance, financial measures, 
sukuk structure, and Sukuk Ratings. These inconsistencies and the limited studies on this area in Islamic finance 
become motivation to conduct this study. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2.1 below reviews the 
role of sukuk rating in sukuk markets and theoretical framework, followed by elaboration of the effect of corporate 
governance, financial measures, sukuk structure, on sukuk ratings in section 2.4. The methodological processes are 
discussed from section 3.0. Section 4.0 presents the empirical results and analyses as well as discussions of the 
results. Finally conclusion with limitation of the research of the study and some recommendations are provided in 
section 5.0.    
2. The Role of Sukuk Rating in Sukuk Markets 
Sukuk ratings of a firm, also conventionally known as credit ratings or bond ratings of a firm are determined by 
the assessment of the probability distribution of future cash flows to bondholders of the rating agencies, which in 
turn, depends on the future cash flows to the firm. Two basic types of sukuk ratings can be found in the literature.  
They are those sukuk ratings, designed for specific debt issues or other financial obligations applicable in sukuk 
markets and those sukuk ratings for debt issuers applicable in sukuk markets (Huang, et al. 2004). The former is the 
one most frequently studied and can be referred to as a ‘‘bond rating’’ or ‘‘issue credit rating.’’ It is essentially an 
attempt to inform the public of the likelihood of an investor receiving the promised principal and interest payments 
associated with a sukuk issue. The latter is a current opinion of overall capacity of issuers to pay their financial 
obligations, which conveys their fundamental creditworthiness (Huang et al. 2004). Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al 92006) 
demonstrated that the creditworthiness of a firm is determined by assessing the likelihood that its future cash flows 
will be sufficient to cover costs of debt service and principal payments. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) stated that 
bond market access is an important determinant of financial leverage. (Graham and Harvey 2001) reveal that credit 
ratings are the second most crucial factors influencing a firm’s debt policy. This rating can be referred to as 
‘‘counterparty sukuk ratings,’’ ‘‘default sukuk ratings’’ or ‘‘issuer sukuk ratings’’ (Huang et al. 2004). The default 
sukuk rating can be assumed for short horizon of one year, whereas the sukuk ratings’’ or ‘‘issue sukuk ratings can 
be assumed for long horizon (Altman and Rijken 2004). Further, Definitions of these ratings are released by these 
rating agencies, which they themselves are firms, but these firms are not 'buy', 'hold' or 'sell' indicators (Altman and 
Rijken 2004).  
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2.1 The Effect of Corporate Governance, financial measures, Sukuk Structure, on sukuk ratings 
2.1.1 The relationship between corporate governance and sukuk ratings 
Board Size can be defined as the number of directors sitting on the board. According to agency theory, limiting 
board size to a particular level is generally believed to be improving financial performance. Previous studies found 
negative/ positive effect of board size on performance of firms. Example, Sengupta (1998) finds a negative 
relationship between firms’ disclosure quality ratings and the cost of debt financing as reflected in realized yields on 
new debt issues. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that firms with a higher percentage of outside directors on the 
board enjoy lower bond yields and higher ratings on their new debt issues.  Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al. (2006) find that 
size is significantly positively correlated with credit ratings and SUBORD are significantly negatively correlated 
with ratings. Consistent with prior research, board size is calculated as the total number of directors on the board for 
this research. 
CEO Duality can be defined as the number of directors sitting on the board. According to agency theory, 
limiting board size to a particular level is generally believed to be improving financial performance. (Ashbaugh-
Skaife, et al. 2006) Found a marginally significant negative coefficient on CEO (chairman) duality (CEOPOWER) 
and this latter result suggests that it is costly for firms, in terms of default risk, to cede the chief executive officer 
with too much board control. 
Boards that are made up exclusively of independent directors are also linked to superior performance. This 
duality in the board independence-performance relation suggests that there is not a single board structure that is 
optimal for all funds (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003). Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al. (2006) found that the coefficients on 
board independent to be positive and significant at conventional levels. This result is consistent with (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003) who find that firms with a greater proportion of independent outside directors on the board have 
higher bond ratings.  
H1: Board Size, CEO duality, and Board Independent affect the relationship between corporate governance and 
sukuk ratings 
2.1.2 The Relationship between Financial Ratios and sukuk ratings 
Financial leverage is the degree to which the investors utilize the borrowed money. Financial leverage also 
known as debt ratio and is calculated as “Total debt divided by total assets” (Huang et al. 2004; Vassalou and Xing 
2004). Therefore, financial leverage is expected to be inversely related to bond ratings. (Klock, et al. 2005) also 
found that strong antitakeover provisions to have been associated with a lower cost of debt financing while weak 
antitakeover provisions to have been associated with a higher cost of debt financing, with a difference of about 34 
basis points between the two groups. Previous studies found mixed evidences on effects of financial leverage on the 
relationship between financial ratios and sukuk yields and sukuk ratings relationship. Financial leverage is 
significantly negatively correlated with ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al. 2006). Purwaningsih (2013) indicate that 
financial leverage has no significant effect on bond ratings (p.365). Study shows that financial leverage does not 
affect the relationship between financial ratios and sukuk yields and sukuk ratings (Kilapong and Setiawati)(n.d)  
Profitability has been used by many researchers in relation to credit ratings example, (Surkan and Singleton 
1990); (Joh 2003). Avramov, et al. (2009) investigated profitability  based on (i) raw and risk-adjusted portfolio 
returns,(ii)characteristic- adjusted portfolio returns,(iii)individual stock returns, and (iv)individual stock returns risk-
adjusted by asset pricing models, do conclusively suggested that higher-rated stocks realize higher raw, risk-
adjusted, as well as characteristics-adjusted returns than lower- rated stocks. The negative relation between credit 
risk and returns is not a new finding and it has been documented by (Dichev 1998); (Garlappi, et al. 2008), and by 
(Campbell, et al. 2008). However, the positive relation between credit risk and returns is consistence with result of 
(Vassalou and Xing 2004) who calculated the distance to default, find a positive relation between distress risk and 
returns. Study shows that profitability does not affect the relationship between financial ratios and sukuk yields and 
sukuk ratings (Kilapong and Setiawati)(n.d). Furthermore, a number of studies from the literature have shown the 
importance of firm size in influencing the working capital performance. Study shows that firm size have positive 
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effect on the relationship between financial ratios and sukuk yields and sukuk ratings (Kilapong and Setiawati)(n.d). 
However, Purwaningsih (2013) indicated that issues size have no significant effect on bond ratings (p.365). 
H2: financial leverage, Profitability, and Issues Size affect the relationship between financial ratios and sukuk 
ratings Relationship 
2.1.3 The Relationship between Sukuk Structure and Sukuk Ratings 
 “Sukuk” is the Arabic name for a financial certificate but can be seen as an Islamic equivalent of bond (Yean 
2009). However, if Sukuk are clearly not defined as conventional shares or bonds, they are somehow defined 
according to the AAOIFI standard norm number 17 as certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in 
the ownership of tangible assets, usufructs and services or (in the ownership of) the assets of particular projects or 
special investment activity (Anass 2015) “In general, a sukuk constitutes partial ownership in a debt (sukuk 
murabaha), asset (sukuk al ijara), project, (sukuk al musharaka), or investment (sukuk al istithmar). Since the sale of 
debt, except at its face value, is not generally acceptable by scholars, the use of sukuk where debt receivables are a 
noticeable proportion remains a Shariah issue”(Lahsasna and Lin 2012). 
H3: Ijarah, Musyarakah, Murabahah, Mudharabah, istithmar, and Al-Bai' Bithaman Ajil affect the relationship 
between Sukuk Structure and Sukuk Ratings Relationship 
In conclusion, this chapter described the theory applied in this thesis in order to guide the research. The research 
uses institutional theory as a methodological tool to analyse the data obtained to investigate the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the relationships between corporate governance, financial measures sukuk 
structures and sukuk rating. The following chapter elucidates the methodology used to obtain data surrounding 
corporate governance mechanisms in the corporate governance, financial measures, sukuk structure, and sukuk 
rating relationship. 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Data Collection and Sample Selection 
The data for this study has been drawn from annually returns of all sukuk issuing firms listed in bursa Malaysian 
after extracting them from the security commission database, subject to several selection criteria. First, balance 
sheets of the firms must have at least twelve consecutive monthly return observations. In addition, as in Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2002), firms that, at the beginning of the issuing (holding) period, have market capitalization that would 
place them in the bottom of bursa Malaysian deciles are excluded. This is done to ensure that the empirical findings 
are not driven by low priced and extremely illiquid stocks as demonstrated in the data collections procedures of 
(Hovakimian, et al. 2009). The filtering procedure delivers a population of 123 companies. From this population, 
those companies that are rated by Rating Agency Malaysia (hereafter referred to as RAM) and rating agency of 
Malaysian Rating Corporation Berhad (hereafter referred as to MARC) equivalent to Standard & Poor’s, were 
chosen with 25 rated companies left from 2008 through 2012 period. Table 1 shows the sample selection 
procedures. 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection Procedures 
Sample and data 
Total 
2008 - 2013 
Total number of issuers listed in bursa Malaysia (2008 – 2013)  123 
Companies excluded  from analysis -98 
Total Sample  25 
 
The 98 companies were not listed in bursa Malaysia website which were almost privately owned companies that 
were excluded from further analysis and this study focused on looking publicly listed companies. The rating 
agencies of issuers rating used are based on RAM and MARC. Further, the RAM and MARC issuer rating used here 
is an essential component of the analysis of this study. Note that the two rating agencies  of Malaysia assigns this 
rating to a firm, not a bond in the same way as Standard & Poor’s assigns this rating to a firm, not a bond. As 
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defined by S&P, prior to 1998, this issuer rating is based on the firm’s most senior publicly traded debt however, 
after 1998; this rating is based on the overall quality of the firm’s outstanding debt, either public or private 
(Hovakimian, et al. 2009). That is, before 1998, the issuer rating represents a select subsample of company bonds, 
after 1998, it represents all company debt (Hovakimian, et al. 2009). This rating is available from rating agencies on 
an annually basis starting from the time that sukuk is issued in Malaysia. In transforming the S&P ratings into 
conventional numerical scores, AAA takes on the value 1 and D takes on the value 22.4 Thus, a higher numerical 
score corresponds to a lower credit rating or higher credit risk. Numerical ratings at or below 10 (BBB− or better) 
are considered investment-grade, and ratings of 11 or higher (BB+ or worse) are labelled high-yield or non-
investment grade (Hovakimian, et al. 2009). Similarly, following Hovakimian, et al. (2009), the numerical ratings 
for this study can be considered investment-grade as follows: AAA = 9, P1 = 8, AA =7, A = 6, BBB = 5, BB = 4, B 
= 3, C = 2, D =1.  Note that the meaning of the ratings between RAM and MARC are same. Table 2 shows sukuk 
rating processes based on RAM and MARC for the sample of the study. 
 
Table 2 Sukuk Rating Processes   
Number of Issuers Ratings Codes Description Percentages (%) 
9 AAA 9 superior safety 0.36 
1 P1 8 very high safety 0.04 
13 AA 7 high safety 0.52 
1 A 6 adequate safety 0.04 
1 BB 4 moderate safety 0.04 
0 B 3 low safety - 
0 C 2 very low safety   - 
0 D 1 high likelihood of default - 
25  100% 
3.1.1Models Assumption from Conceptual Frameworks 
Previous empirical studies found that the ratings level influenced the market reaction to bond rating changes. Goh 
and Ederington (1999) found that the market reacts more strongly to downgrade at the lower end of the rating scale. 
These lower ends of the rating scale are referred to as “below investment grade and have a higher risk of default if 
they are poorly rated firms (Hull, et al. 2004) and (Purda 2007).  This study uses ordered logit regression model. 
3.1.2 Ordered Logit Regression model 
According to Torres-Reyna (2012), when a dependent variable has more than two categories and the values of 
each category have a meaningful sequential order where a value is indeed ‘higher’ than the previous one, then 
ordinal logit can be used. Following (Torres-Reyna 2012), ordinal logit estimates a score,S, as a linear function of 
the X’s.  Then using ordered logit regression model, the regression framework then models the sukuk ratings as 
separate linear equations. accordingly, three regressions will be performed having been specified as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
 
 sukuk ratings of firm i over a fiscal year t, Again, this variable will take the form of sukuk ratings. 
  The ith Chairman duality of corporate governance that influence the level of the relationship between 
corporate governance and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market of firm at time t, 
 The ith board size of corporate governance that influence the level of the relationship between corporate 
governance and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market of firm at time t, 
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 The ith board independent of corporate governance that influences the level of the relationship between 
corporate governance and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market of firm at time t, 
 The ith ijarah  of sukuk structure that influence the level of the relationship between sukuk structure and 
sukuk rating in Islamic financial market firm at time t, 
 The ith musyarakah of sukuk structure that influence the level of the relationship between sukuk 
structure and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market firm at time t, 
 The ith murabahah of sukuk structure that influence the level of the relationship between sukuk 
structure and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market firm at time t, 
 The ith mudharabah of sukuk structure that influence the level of the relationship between sukuk 
structure and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market firm at time t, 
 The ith istithmar of sukuk structure that influence the level of the relationship between sukuk structure 
and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market firm at time t, 
 The ith al-bai’ bithaman ajil of sukuk structure that influence the level of the relationship between 
sukuk structure and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market of firm at time t, 
 The ith financial leverage of financial ratios that influence the level of the relationship between financial 
variables and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market of firm at time t, 
 The ith profitability of financial ratios that influence the level of the relationship between financial 
variables and sukuk rating in Islamic financial market of firm at time t, 
= the slope and is constant term, and 
the coefficients relating the p explanatory variables to the variables of interest. 
 Error terms  
The study then estimates the above regression cross-sectional models within one, two, three, four and five digit 
requiring a minimum of twenty-five firms in each industry grouping and compares their models results. 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
Table 3 summarized and described data found during research. The table reports descriptive statistics of sample 
size for the study used which includes, corporate governance, financial measures and sukuk structure that can 
explain sukuk ratings. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables 
Variable Obs Median Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Corporate Governance       
Chairman duality 150 0 0.04  0.1966157 0  1 
Board Size 150 8.00 8.96 2.356997 5 17 
Board Independent  150 44.40 46.21133 10.66384 25 66.7 
Financial Variables       
Financial Leverage  150 0.50 0.5272667 0.1750471 0.2 0.89 
Profitability  150 0.05 0.0569933 0.0782264 -0.14 0.84 
Issue Size  150 6.50 6.748973 1.125359 4.29978 9.30316 
Sukuk structure       
Ijarah 150 0 0.12 0.3260502 0 1 
Musyarakah 150 0 0.4 0.4915392 0 1 
Murabahah 150 0 0.2 0.40134 0 1 
Mudharabah 150 0 0.08 0.2722021 0 1 
Sukuk istithmar 150 0 0.16 0.3678342 0 1 
Al-Bai' Bithaman Ajil 150 0 0.04 0.1966157 0 1 
Sukuk Rating 150 7 7.6 1.237013 4 9 
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the various corporate mechanisms and firm-characteristic control 
variables of corporate governance, financial ratios, and sukuk structure. Within the corporate governance 
component, it is found that the average (median) number of board size that owns the firm’s sukuk ratings is 896% 
(8%). The standard deviation of the firm’s sukuk ratings is 235% and the upper and the lower quartile value is 17% 
and 5%. The average (median) percentage of sukuk ratings held by board independent is 4621% (4440%). The 
standard deviation of the firm’s sukuk ratings is 1066% and the upper and the lower quartile value are 6670% and 
25% respectively. The average (median) percentage of sukuk ratings held by Chairman Duality is 4% (0). The 
standard deviation of the firm’s sukuk ratings is 19% and the upper and the lower quartile value is 100% and 0% 
respectively. This is because the CEO duality is a binary variable.  Within the “financial measures and influence” 
component of governance, the descriptive statistics indicate that the average (median) percentage of financial 
leverage is 53% (50%). The standard deviation of the firm’s sukuk ratings is 18% and the upper and lower quartile 
value is 89% and 20% respectively.  The average (median) percentage of profitability is 6% (5%).  The standard 
deviation of the firm’s sukuk ratings is 8% and the upper and the lower quartile value is positive 84% and negative 
(-) 14% respectively. The average (median) p the average (median) percentage of issue size is 674% (650%).  The 
standard deviation of the firm’s sukuk ratings is 113% and the upper and lower quartile value is 930% and 430% 
respectively.   
Within the “sukuk structure and influence” component of corporate mechanisms, the descriptive statistics 
indicate that the average (median) percentage of ijarah is 12% (0) The standard deviation of the firm’s sukuk ratings 
is 33% and the upper and the lower quartile value is 100% and 0%. This is because the ijarah structure and the other 
five structure “musyarakah, murabahah, mudharabah, sukuk istithmar and al-bai' bithaman ajil”are binary variables. 
The descriptive statistics indicate that the average (median) percentage of musyarakah is 40% (0). The standard 
deviation of the firm’s sukuk ratings is 49% and the upper and the lower quartile value is 100% and 0%. The 
descriptive statistics indicate that the average (median) percentage of murabahah is 20% (0). The standard deviation 
of the firm’s sukuk ratings is 40% and the upper and the lower quartile value is 100% and 0%. The descriptive 
statistics indicate that the average (median) percentage of mudharabah is 8% (0). The standard deviation of the 
firm’s sukuk ratings is 27% and the upper and the lower quartile value is 100% and 0%. The descriptive statistics 
indicate that the average (median) percentage of sukuk istithmar is 16% (0). The standard deviation of the firm’s 
sukuk ratings is 37% and the upper and the lower quartile value is 100% and 0%. The descriptive statistics indicate 
that the average (median) percentage of al-bai' bithaman ajil is 4% (0). The standard deviation of the firm’s sukuk 
ratings is 20% and the upper and the lower quartile value is 100% and 0% respectively.  Turning to the dependent 
variables, it is  noted that the median credit rating is 7.0 implying a sukuk rating in the PI to A range, and that fifty 
two percent (52%) of the sample firms have grade of sukuk ratings  (see: table 3.4). 
4.1. Correlation Relationship among Variables 
Table 4 presents correlations among the characteristics of various variables of corporate governance, financial 
ratios, and sukuk structure and between these variables and sukuk ratings. The Spearman rank-order correlations are 
presented in the table. In table 8 the simple correlations between each of the characteristics of various variables of 
corporate governance, financial measures, sukuk structure and sukuk rating variable are in the predicted directions 
and are statistically significant at the significant levels .01 or below the significant levels .01 except for the ABBA -
0.5960 variable which is negative and significant but deleted due its omission from further analysis. Specifically, the 
research of this study finds that CEO duality, board size, and profitability, issue size as well as ijarah, musyarakah 
and murabahah are significantly positively correlated with sukuk ratings. Financial leverage, board independent as 
well as mudharabah and sukuk istithmar are significantly negatively correlated with sukuk ratings. The study finds 
that several of the firm characteristic variables exhibit high intercorrelations suggesting that the standard errors on 
coefficients of these variables in the ordered logit model presented in the next section are likely to be overestimated, 
leading to conservative test results. 
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Table 4: Correlation 
Research variables of  Ijarah; Musyarakah; Murabahan; CEO; Board Size, profitability and Issuer size have positive effects on relationships between corporate governance, financial measures and 
sukuk structure on sukuk rating, whereas the rest of research variables have negative effects the relationships 
              IJAR MUS MUR   MUD IST ABBA  CEOD BS BI FL PR ISS Rating    
IJAR 1.0000             
MUS -0.3015 1.0000            
MUR -0.1846 -0.4082 1.0000           
MUD -0.1089 -0.2408 -0.1474 1.0000          
IST -0.1612 -0.3563 -0.2182 -0.1287 1.0000         
ABBA -0.0754 -0.1667 -0.1021 -0.0602 -0.0891 1.0000        
CEOD -0.0303 0.1003 -0.0410 -0.0242 -0.0358 -0.0167 1.0000       
BS 0.1373 -0.3105 -0.0553 0.0050 0.4487 -0.1848 -0.0684 1.0000      
BI 0.3389 -0.1397 -0.0597 0.2087 -0.2328 0.0555 -0.0255 -0.3020 1.0000     
FL -0.2153 0.0526 -0.2940 0.4187 -0.0401 0.3211 0.0576 -0.0998 0.0932 1.0000    
PR 0.1563 0.0964 0.0086 -0.1588 -0.0548 -0.1955 0.0032 -0.0837 0.0545 -0.4396 1.0000   
ISS -0.2108   -0.2117    0.1649   -0.0836    0.3829   -0.0583   -0.0252   -0.2884    0.0604 0.0070    0.0408    1.0000  
Rating 0.0200 0.1987 0.0811 -0.0239 -0.0354 -0.5960 0.0266 0.1763 -0.0220 -0.2406 0.2107 0.0290 1.0000 
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Table 4 shows that the thirteen of the fourteen research variables exhibit Pearson correlations with the sukuk 
rating variable that is significant at .01 or below. The correlations among the various control variables of corporate 
governance, financial ratios, and sukuk structure generally fall below -0.5960.  For example, for corporate 
governance variables, the intercorrelations with variable of the sukuk rating are 0.0266 for CEO duality, 0.1763 for 
board size and -0.0220 for board independent. For financial ratios, the intercorrelations with the sukuk rating 
variable are -0.2406 for financial leverage, 0.2107 for profitability, and 0.0290 for issues size. For sukuk structure 
variables, the intercorrelations with variable of the sukuk rating are 0.0200 for ijarah, 0.1987 for musyarakah, 
0.0811 for murabahah, -0.0239 for mudharabah,  -0.0354 for istithmar and -0.5960 for al-bai bithaman ajil. 
4.2 Empirical Tests and Results of the Study 
This section, examine the effects of corporate governance, financial ratios, and sukuk structure on the sukuk 
ratings using an ordered logit model. This model incorporates the interaction terms between corporate governance, 
financial ratios, and sukuk structure into the standard model of sukuk ratings and enables the calculations of the: 
bivariate methodology. After the model incorporates the interaction terms between corporate governance, financial 
ratios, and sukuk structure into the standard model of sukuk ratings with the bivariate methodology, marginal effects 
of corporate governance, financial ratios, and sukuk structure on sukuk rating are elaborated in the section that 
follows.  The last section focuses the calculations of the frequency of adjustment toward the ratings at different 
levels of Islamic financial markets.   
4.2.1 Ordered Logit Results of Bivariate Methodology 
The empirical tests of the current study are derived from a general model that represents sukuk ratings as a 
function of determinant factors of corporate governance, financial ratios, and sukuk structure following (Hollis 
Ashbaugh 2004): 
Sukuk Rating = f (corporate governance). 
To test the predicted relations between corporate governance, financial ratios, and sukuk structure on sukuk 
ratings, we estimate a series of ordered logit models.  Ordered logit models are used because the dependent variable 
has more than two categories and the values of each category have a meaningful sequential order where a value is 
indeed ‘higher’ than the previous one. According to (Torres-Reyna 2012), when a dependent variable has more than 
two categories and the values of each category have a meaningful sequential order where a value is indeed ‘higher’ 
than the previous one, then ordinal logit can be used. Following (Torres-Reyna 2012), ordinal logit estimates a 
score, sukuk rating, as a linear function of the corporate governance, financial ratios, and sukuk structure. Table 9 
provides result of ordered logit model of the effect corporate governance, financial ratios, and sukuk structure on 
sukuk rating. 
 
Table 5: Results of Ordered Logit Model  
Variables Predicted Estimated Coefficient 
 Sign Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 
Corporate governance      
CEOD + .784917*** 
(1.435493) 
  
BS + .1319242*** 
(.0725576) 
  
BI + .0063581*** 
(.0154729) 
  
Financial ratio     
FL -  1.271048*** 
(1.115808) 
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PR +  5.45046*** 
(4.112746) 
 
ISS +  .0427681*** 
(.1492396) 
 
Sukuk Structure     
IJARAH +   42.22761*** 
(11183.63) 
MUSYARAKAH +   42.68388*** 
(11183.63) 
MURABAHAH +   42.48386*** 
(11183.63) 
MUDHARABAH +   41.02175*** 
(11183.63) 
ISTITHMAR +   41.90354*** 
(11183.63) 
Log likelihood  -162.36436 -160.10518 -136.07195 
Likelihood test  3.50 8.02 56.09 
Pseudo R2  0.0107 0.0244 0.1709 
N  25 25 25 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level or better, respectively. 
 
The current study begins by estimating the model using only the firm characteristic variables to provide a 
benchmark from which to assess the incremental effect of various corporate governance, financial ratios, and sukuk 
structure control variables on credit ratings.  
4.2.1.1 Ordered Logit Results of Corporate Governance 
The benchmark results are reported in the model 1 column of table 5. All of the estimated coefficients on 
chairman duality, board size, and board independent have the expected sign and are significant at the 0.01 level or 
better. The results document that sukuk ratings are positively related to chairman duality, board size, and board 
independent. This results are consistent with the results of (Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al. 2006) who found that the 
coefficients on board independent to be positive and significant at conventional levels and (Bhojraj and Sengupta 
2003) who find that firms with a greater proportion of independent outside directors on the board have higher bond 
ratings. The benchmark model yields a Likelihood test of 3.50 which is significant at the 0.01 level, and has a Log 
likelihood -162.36436 percent. 
Theoretical model: 
 
 
Empirical model: 
Sukuk Rating = 0.784917(CEOD) + 0.1319242(BS) + 0.0063581(BI) 
This model fits the data well (log likelihood = -162.36436 P>|t|) and Pseudo R2 =     0.0107) 
4.2.1.2 Ordered Logit Results of Financial Measures 
The remaining columns of table 5 report the results of testing whether the various components of financial 
variables within the RAM and MARC framework are associated with sukuk ratings. In column 2 of table 5, the 
results of estimating the model incorporating the “financial variables and Influence” component on sukuk ratings is 
reported. All of the estimated coefficients on financial leverages, profitability and issues size have the expected sign 
and are significant at the 0.01 level or better. The results document that sukuk ratings are negatively related to 
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financial leverages. This result is consistence with the result of (Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al. 2006) who found that 
financial leverage is significantly negatively correlated with ratings  however, the contradicts the result of 
(Purwaningsih 2013) who indicate that financial leverage have no significant effect on bond ratings. The results also 
documented that sukuk ratings are positively related to profitability. The result is consistent with results of 
(Avramov, et al. 2009) who investigated profitability based on (i) raw and risk-adjusted portfolio returns, (ii) 
characteristic- adjusted portfolio returns, (iii) individual stock returns, and (iv) individual stock returns risk-adjusted 
by asset pricing models, do conclusively suggested that higher-rated stocks realize higher raw, risk-adjusted, as well 
as characteristics-adjusted returns than lower- rated stocks. However, the result contradicted the results of Dichev 
1998); (Garlappi, et al. 2008), and by (Campbellet al. 2008) who found negative relation between credit risk and 
returns. Further, the results document that sukuk ratings are positively related to issues size.  The result is consistent 
with results of (Kilapong and Setiawati)(n.d) who showed that firm size have positive effect on the relationship 
between financial ratios and sukuk ratings and (Purwaningsih 2013) who  indicated that issues size have no 
significant effect on bond ratings. The benchmark model yields a likelihood test of 8.02 which is significant at 
significant level of 0.01, and has a log likelihood -160.10518 percent. 
Theoretical model: 
 
 
Empirical model: 
Sukuk Rating = -1.271048(FL) + 5.450463(PR) + 0.0427681(ISS) 
This model fits the data well (log likelihood = -160.10518 P>|t|) and Pseudo R2 = 0.0244) 
4.2.1.3 Ordered Logit Results of Sukuk Structure 
The last remaining columns of table 5 report the results of testing whether the various components of sukuk 
structure within the RAM and MARC framework are associated with sukuk ratings. In column 3 of table 5 the 
results of estimating the model incorporating the “sukuk structure and Influence” component of sukuk structure on 
sukuk ratings are reported.  All of the estimated coefficients on ijarah, musyarakah, murabahah, mudharabah, and 
sukuk istithmar, have the expected sign and are significant at the 0.01 levels or better. The results document that 
sukuk ratings are positively related to ijarah, musyarakah, murabahah, mudharabah, and sukuk istithmar. The 
benchmark model yields a likelihood test of 56.09 which is significant at significant level of 0.01, and has a log 
likelihood -136.07195 percent. 
Theoretical model: 
 
 
Empirical model: 
Sukuk Rating = 42.22761(IJAR) + 42.68388(MUS) + 42.48386(MUR) + 41.02175(MUD) + 41.90354(IST). This 
model fits the data well (Log likelihood = -136.07195, P>|t) and Pseudo R2 = 0.1709). 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to provide empirical findings whether or not corporate governance, financial 
ratios and sukuk structure, have significant influences on sukuk ratings.   The sample of this study is 25 publicly 
listed Malaysian firms in the Malaysian Stock Exchange during 2008 and 2012. The findings in this paper suggest 
that corporate governance, are positively related to sukuk rating. The results document that sukuk ratings are 
positively related to chairman duality, board size, and board independent. The positively sign is due to boards that 
are made up exclusively of independent directors are linked to superior performance. The findings in this paper also 
suggest that sukuk ratings are negatively related to financial leverages and positively related to profitability and 
issue size. The positive sign is caused by various antitakeover and shareholder protection provisions because 
antitakeover governance provisions lower the cost of debt financing and that strong antitakeover provisions are 
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associated with a lower cost of debt financing while weak antitakeover provisions are associated with a higher cost 
of debt financing.  Corporate governance, financial ratios, and sukuk structure of firms contributed positively to the 
sukuk ratings study, which suggest that this is an important factor that helps broaden knowledge of sukuk rating in 
Islamic financial literature.  
The present study has several limitations. This study only measures corporate governance, financial ratios and 
sukuk structure to explain sukuk rating. Based on the result of this study, the future research can use this study as a 
reference for applying method of sukuk rating in broader terms. For example, future research can use internal factor, 
such as earning persistence and sukuk structures, to get results that are more accurate. The three models, which were 
built upon the ordered logit, fit the data well and the results are significant.  This is despites that the data used in the 
current study is only data of six years, that is, from year 2008 through 2013, which can be biased using other 
models. As a result, more than data of six years would have been robust.  
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